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:niTRODUCT ION

The general purpose of this study is to examine the experience
of guilt as it has been describ.ed by contemporary psychologists and to
dete~ine

if some of their findings can be used by theologians to

achie'Je a deeper understanding of the sacrament of Penance.

In

particular, the thesis will examine the im?lications of the ps,ychological
experience of guilt for the

r1~-1

rite of Penance.

In this introduction,

we will briefly touch on a few of the major points that will be developed

in the paper.
A. nu;'nber of differe:1t theorj.es concerning guilt are reflected

i.n psychological literature.

For exa.mple, Thoma.s Oden, in The Structure

of Ar.;areness, describes authentic huma.·,.·d ty as Hfull a."ld open responsiveness to the moment, the readiness to receive and re-create what is given

In sin, this mot;Jent is lost forever.

Por Oden, sub-

jactive guilt is the awareness or memor,r of this lost moment.
Oden draws upon Carl Rogers' theories of incongruence and

.!tcceptance.

It should be pointed out here, h011ever, ti:.a t the ps;ycholo-

gist 1 s vi e>v of guilt differs from the theologian 1 s in a nurnber of importcJ!lt

A theologian would say that subjective guilt is the

W8:J'S.

a-vmrc:\<:>.ss of unforgiven sin and that the .stet-a of sin remains.

"/!'hen

·------------------1
Thomas CdFJ?'!, Th0 Structure of .hraren-ass (Nashville: Abtngdon
"'rt:H"C.':
·.·.'"l ....,J

.~,

~~·£~(';\
.,."'-""/'

··;

..:. •

4"7t •

1

'

a

p~·son

2

seeks out a priest of minister in order to confess his guilt,

he is seeking the forgiveness of Christ.

T'ne priest or minister, there-

fore, sees subjective guilt as the. person's a1-1areness that he is
.
..
.
separated from Christ and now seeks to be reconciled with Him.
~~ilt,

in this perspective, is seen as a

healt~

Thus,

or good thing because

it directs the person back to Christ.
p~chiatrist

The perspective of a ps,ychologist or
different.

is much

'
He mey be confronted
with a person who is suffering from.~ a

sense of guilt ( ofte!l based on a very real act) and who ha·s no hope or
forgiveness.

The person has been unable to find any sense of recon-

ciliation within his o·.n circle of frie:sds and family.
p~Jchotherapy,

the tharapist offers the client the one

In Rogerian
~~ing

that Will

free hL'1'1 from his destructive sense of guilt and ~11~ him to grow.
7hat one th.i.ng is total acceptance.
The experience of Christ '-s accepta."lce is often very sudden.

A

person cannot hold his m·m guilt and receive Christ's acceptance

. SlmU.J..
. ,ta...'leOUSly •
;:,ccept himself.

As he experiences Christ's acceptance, he must come to

In theological terms, guilt can be seen as an awareness

of separation from Christ and a call to new grovnh in Him.

The experience of acceptance in a psychotherapeutic situation
:s r1::ch different.· The

proces~

of

i::: gradual and often verJ painful.

kno~1ing

and experiencing acceptance

A person is likely to hold on to

his sense of guilt even as he comes to know the therapist's
The therapist sees th9 ,atient's

pers~stence

acc~ptance.

in guilt (whether or not

3
the patient's sense of guilt is in pr.oportion to the act) as a refusal
to grow.
The difference between the two situations lies in the reality of
faith and Christ Himself.
self from Christ by sin.

A person who believes in Christ separates himHe experiences guilt as an awareness of his

separation from Christ and a call to return to Him.

Psychology does

In human terms, a person does something

not and cannot presuppose faith.

that he perceives as being incongruent with his own self-image •. He cannot incorporate this act as part of his own personality ( 11 ! couldn't
have done. it.

It's not me." or

11

! can't help myself. I keep doing it.").

The ps,ychologist attempts to show the patient that he is
ac~eptable

unconditional~

and helps him grow to-:<ard a more realistic self-image.· To the

extent that the patient persists in his sense of guilt and refuses the
psychologist's acce?tance, he is refusing to grow.
~fuat

theoloeians find of particular interest in this, howe:ver, is

:1ot a definition of guil.t, but the means used to alleviate gUilt.

Two

dintinct schools of thought regarding guilt are represented by Hobart
Mowrer and carl Rogers.

l1owrer' s theory states that a sense of guilt is

&.lle·.riated when one confesses his sin.

(A ?sychotic patient, quoted by

!1o-..rrer to support his argurnent, calls tJlis th·~ r:Dick Tracy theory of
2
th<H'apy. rr ) Roeer!1_, on the other hand, suggests that the therapist
·;:oc:<Y.i.de the patient with a sense of betng '.mconditionally accepted.

,'·

Ibid., p. 102.

As

4
the patient discovers that he is accepted despite both the action

~~d

the feelings that motivated the action, he can let go of his guilt.

Thus,

for Mot-n-er, the patie.'lt alleviates his own guilt by confessj.ng his
actions.

For Rogers, guilt is alleviated by the experience of being
3
accepted by another.
The significance of Rogers' understanding of acceptance becomes

apparent when one views the change in emphasis from the old rite of
Confession to the new rtte.
pages, the emphasis

As will be discussed in the following

h<:'.s moved

from confes.sion and judgment to acceptance,

forgiveness, and reconciliation.
This has been a brief introduction to a few of the ideas which
will be discussed in the course of this study.

Po?e Paul VI, in his

address on the significance of the Pastoral Norms on Penance (Paoal
Audience, Castel Gandolfo, July 19, 1972) referred to his fellow priests
as

ndoctors of souls ••• 'psychiatrists' of grace."

of

psycholo~~,

Perhaps the science

concerned with the healing process of the rrdnd, will be

able to enhance our understanding of the healing power of grace in Con.fession.

Ibid., p. 102.

Part Ia THE

PSYCHOLCG~CAL

EXPERIENCE OF GUILT

CHAP~

I

TRUE GUIT.T - A !·!A':'TER OF DECISION

A question of Nature

In this section several theories of guilt will be examined (ineluding those of Freud, Boisen, Mowrer, and Rogers) in relation to the
ps,ychologists 1 over-all vision of Man.

Obviously, none of these theories

will be dealt with in detail. ·Rather, these brief sketches are designed
to highlight seteral of the Major schools of thought concerning the
ps,ycholdgical experience of guilt.
At least in theory, Freud did not
recognize
the existence
1
.
authentic guilt as it was defined in the Introduction.

oi

Freud saw man as

biologically determined and the purpose of :man's life and "simply the
1

programme of the pleasure principle. rr

.

Fear of authority figures re-

sulted in internalized rules and reg:rlations uhich became the superego.
In boys, this fear of authority figures could be traced to fear of
castration by the father.

Girls remained something of a

~stery

to Freud,

and he never succeeded in pin-pointing the source of superego development

in them.

The suparego (or when it operated on a conscious level, con-

science) frustrated

~~·s

desire for pleasure and was, therefore, the

2
:::o u·ce of man 1 s misery.

•

1

Sigmund Freud, Civ·ilization and Its Discontents (New York:
l·r.:.:"t·:m, 1962, originally published in Ge:111aey, '~930), p. 23.
2
1bid.' p. 33.

6
The superego forced the person to repress his natural drives
and the frustration of these natu~a:-1 drives resulted in gut1t-£eelin;s.
These feelings of guilt lay "• •• not in aeything wrong or
the individual has done but in things he

-3

because of repression."

Authentic

mere~

~lt

1

sintul 1 which

wants to do but cannot

played no part in a world

determined qy biological drives.
Religion was, in Freud's theor.y, one of the major forces that
kept man enslaved to the forces of the superego.

Martin Buher ·dismisses

Freud's contentions as a last gasp (hopefully, a dying gasp).of the

4
Enlightenment attack against religion.

David Bakan 6omea up with the

extremely subtle, and what perhaps could kindly be called imaginative,
t.heor.y that Freud was acting out a reverse Messianic complex.

Freud

saw his people, the European Jews, as victims of their own law,
harrassed and persecuted because of a law that made them different, and,

In Mases and Mon.otheism Freud argues that Moses

therefore, vulnerable.

was a Gentile and thus the Jews were not responsible for the. institution
of the law.
ne~1

lh attacking the superego or conscience, Freud becomes the

J.Ioses, the one who liberates his people from the source of their

5

misery.

3c. Allison, Guilt, Anger

& God (New York: Seabury,

1972), p. 23.

4
....or:'
:;;

.

Hartin Duber, "Gullt .rmd Guilt Feelings," Cross Currents

(~958):

""
::>
David Bakan, Si 1'~~!1•:!. Fre11d and the Jewish ]' :3tic!U Tradi tio'1.
N J · 11V•·~
an N·s1·"·"'d
19·o
·, ,
,._t... ..a ,
;)
•

~~~~{,....,,tc·,.,
~, ........ -'-J.~'...,, " ' '

t

••

f.J

.

"'

1
Freud's motives aside, his theories were soon attacked by~
disillusioned disciples.

tion

gf

In 19.36~ Anton B. Boisen published The Ex:olora-

tho Inner WOrld, and challenged the then current practice among

psychiatrists of equating "normal" with the "average. 11

"The normal

is what most people do, and any deviation from the normal they look upon
with suspicion a..11d di sf.:tvor .•• To be good is unusual and therefore ab-

6

normal."

Boisen saw man as an essentially social being who is not concerned with the aver.:1ge, but with the ideal.
of rna.11' s actions is not :r:leasure, rather

11 • • •

The determining principle
of all human needs the deep-

est and most fundamental is that for response and approval by that social
something which is symbolized by the term God."

7

Boisen did not en-

tirely reject Freud's theories on the impo~ance of childhood, but saw
the formation of the moral person as ~eing a function of a need for
acceptance within a group.

(Boisen's strict social determinism is,

however, mitigated by ·one other factor which will be described below.)
Boisen maint,a~ns·.. that i-t is the social group that sets moral standards
and a person tries. to live by those standards because of a need for
approval .of the group.•
The relationship to the group becomes all important, and a
person judges himself by ethical standards which are deter::n:Lned b-.f the group with which he seeks identification and·

6
J~nton Boisen,. The Exploration of the Inner World (New York:
p. i 64.

7
Ibid. J p. 170.

8

8

whose approval he needs.

The pain of guilt is the

p~in

of isolation from the group.

It

is the violation of the group's ·standard and consequent isolation that·
cause pain, therefore, for Boisen guilt becomes the source, not
symptom ot the person's problems.

th~

As guilt is fncurred by a· Violation

of the group standards, one is dealing with authentic guilt, not guilt-

-

feelings, i.e., the repressed desire to violate a standard.
Boisen maintains that this guilt could be resolved in one of ·

t.hree ways: (1) ·change actions, (2) change groups, or (3) withdraw from
the situation entirely and interpret reality to suit one's own needs.
The result of the third alternative is mental illness.

9

In this schema,

a recognition of the action and·restoration of harmony with the group

is sufficient to resolve guilt.

Boisen does not see forgiveness and

reconciliation as part of a possible resolution of guilt, and that is
one of the central weaknesses of his theory •
B~isen's

•

position was reiterated by Mowrer in 1960 in The Crisis
Reli~ion.

in Pgrchiatrz and

Mowrer points out that if Freud's idea of

guilt as a s,ymptdm were right, the person

wh~

never experiences guilt

'

should be the healthiest, happiest person around.

In reality, the per-

s'Jn who cannot experience guilt is usually diagnosed as psychopathic

or sociopathic.

This partic,ular personality .disorder is one of the most

8

Ibid., p. 172.

9
Ibid., p. 179.

9
difficult to cure.

On the other hand, the person who can admit to

a sense of guilt is more often on the road to recover,r.
as a ·sickness, according to Mowrer,
may

have a basis in reality.

is

To treat guilt

to iinore the fact that the guilt

To recognize guilt as at least in some way

authentic is to offer the hope of forgiveness and.reconciliation.

Mowrer

says that the probletll of mental illness is not one of illness but of sin.
"Sickness," as we sl1all see increasingly in later chapters, ·
is a concept which generates pervasive pessimism and confUsion
in the dol1lain of. psychopat.ltologyj wher,eas, sin for all its
harshness, carries an i.."'!lplication of promise and hopes, a vision
of new pQten1;.ialitie~. Ju.st so long as we deny the reality of
sin, we cut ol.u-selv.3s off, it seems, from the possibility of
radical redempticn ( "reco•;sry"). 10
Mowrer, like Boisen,

s~es
.

man as a social being, responsive and
,_

responsible.

He sympathizes with Boisen's postti'on oh 'guilt but mourns

the fact that

.th~ :P;otest.ant

past6r8.1 couns-eling movement, started in

large part by Boisen, has tended to substitute insight for forgiveness.
"

Han's need for truth demands insight, but his social nature requires
forgiveness.
Therefore, in light of thetotal situation, I see no alternative
but to turn again to the old, painful, but also promising
possibility that man is preeminently a social creature and that
he lives or dies, ps,ychologically and personally, as a function
of the openness, community, relatedness, and integrity which by
good action he attains and by evil action he destroys. 11·

10
0. Hobart Mqw-rer, The Crisis .in Pszchiat:rz and Religion
(Princeton: Van Nostrand, i9b1), p. 4o.

11

Ibid.' p.

44.

10
~

ps.ychologists and theologians have praised Mowrer for his

insistence on moral responsibil:,i ty, however, there are also a. number. .
of weaknesses in his arg\Uilents.

Mowrer insists that all guilt is

authentic guilt and fails to make
guilt and false guilt.

~

distinction between authentic

Later in this stucy, it will be argued that

false guilt ·mq often serve as a mask or facade for tru;e guilt, however,
this

d~s

not mean that false guilt does not exist.

False guilt must

be dealt with in an explicitly psy-chological context in order to approach
'
and confront the .authentic guilt underlying it.
Mowrer also maintains that the only wq to deal effectively' with
guilt is to confess it to a "Significant Other." A therapist or a priest,
according to Mowrer, :ts not a "Significant Other" and confession to one
of them, while perhaps enhancing that particular relationship, will do
nothing to change the person's over-all sense of guilt.

The Significant

Other must be someone present and important in one's social life so that
confession will entail both an acknowledgment or evil action· and a loss
of anonymity.
Mowrer ignores both the meaning of

sacr~~ental

encounter in Con-

fession and the theological presuppositions of the therapeutic relationship.

As Filella points out, the Significant Other for 'the Christian is
12
C!1rist.
The sacrament of Confession is an encounter with Christ and

S.J., "Confession as a l.feans of SelfTaylor,

..-..

11

the priest who,

b.1 virtue

of his priesthood, is tl1e representative of

Christ and the community of Chris~, that is the Church.

The social na- ,

ture of confession and the consequent loss of the anonymity and deceit
of ain, is brought about by virtue or the priest's representation or

Christ and the Church.

Because of the lllter-relation (and one could say

inter-dependence) of each person within the MYstical Bo~, confessi~.c~
never by an isolated act.

"In the Christian Community there is no ~ch

thing as a complete~ secret confession: .~11 confessions are open in·the
.
13
deepest sense of the ·:rcrd. rr
The therapist 1 s acceptance in th·:= therapeutic model is seen as representative acceptance.

The therapist may represent a significant person

in the client's life or society itself.

In the case of false guilt, the

therapist. accepts feelings the client can.'lot accept himself.

He can do

this, according to nrmtning, be~ause all feeli~~s (as distinguisAed from
behavior) have been and are being accepted by God at every.. moment .. this
theory "Till be discussed in much greater detail in Chap:ter Four.

In the

case of authentic guilt, the clien't.~y also see t.ne tnerapis,.'s for ..
giveness as representative forgiveness ~sofar as the therapist represents
society for him.·
M~drer argues that ethics, for the most part, are identical with
tt"1e f!,rvup standard and are taught :·md should be taught to the child

----·------13
Thid., p. 200.

12

through a process called 11 defensive identification. 11

"Defensive identi-

fication is, in· essence, what the Rogerians would call introjection; it
,.

is

.

a process whereby

.

.

.

the child takes over the moral values of his parents

as a wey of defending himself from rejection, insecurity, disapproval."

1h

J1owrer's idea of morality thus becanes a matter of ccnditioning
rather than choice.

Moreover, Brmming argues that since this condition-

ing makes culture and society the criteria of moral standards, rather

15 .

than God, it is essentially a form of idolatry.

Although l'bwrer

initially appears to be an advocate of free choice and moral responsibility
his idea of the moral formation of man is almost as deterministic as
Freud's.

Mowrer sees man as a socially determined being while Freud sees

man as a

biologic~

determined being.

Carl Rogers moves from an idea of man as a socially determihed
being to one whose primary drive is for growth itself.

In Client-

centered 'lllerau, Roge!"S states that "the organiSin has one basic tendency
and striving .. to actualize, maintain, and enhance the experiencing

16

organism. 11

Browning, in explaining this concept states:

This basic drive, or actualization tenden~, is seen as a
forward-moving force that propels the individual toward everincreasing
In short, the actuali.
. auton~ and socialization.
~

14
Don S. Br<>'.ming, Atonement and Psychotherapy (Philadelphia:
Hestmir.i.ster Press., 1.966), p. 190.

iS

Ki~flin,

Ibid.·,; p. 191 •
Carl Rogers, Client-centered TherapY (New York: Houghton

1951), P• 487.

13
zation tendency can be seen as the striving of the organism toward
ever-expanding areas of socialized autongmy •••• It should be pointed
out that this basic actualization tendency refers to the organism
as a whole, is not limited to one specific organ or tissue need,
includes segmental or deficienc,y needs, but also transcends them. 17
In simple terms, Rogers 1 actualizaticn tendency may be th~t
of as a need to grow.

Wnether man is propelled or drawn to change is,

of course, open to debate {Rogers would s~ propelled), but growth itself remains intrinsic to the understanding o:t man.
In Browning 1 s analysis of Rogers., two m~or .concepts are in- .

volvedvdth 'actualization: "the organismic valuing I?rocess" and "Congruence." · The organi~ic valuj,nlit process, according to Browning, can
18
be translated as "experiencing" and "feeling."
What this means is
..

that people tend to choose that which will enhance. their. own beiJlg, that
which will "actualize" them.

They make a decision based on the data

available to them at that manent.

However, as dif.ferent people ,_see

different things as good at <different times, this valuing is a PJ"OCess,
not a fixed-system.

Rogers says tb.at this .abilicy-: to decide is an

organic .function.•
.A ahlld ·is free to choose ·and does so naturally, unles$ his

choices are interfered with by an adult.

'w'lhen confronted with a choice

of doing what he wants or doing l-rhat the adult wants him to do.a the

17
BroV;ning, p. 97.

18
Ibid., p. 101.

child will do what the adult wants him to do in order to keep the love
of the adult.· For. instance, a cltild may have ~been. t~ught that anger
is ~rong; therefore, in order to protect his self-image of being a
good, ~~ lovable, person, he will refuse to admit feelings ot anger
into his self-awareness.

Rogers calls this inability "incongruence."

A person is incongruent if he denies or distorts organismic feelings

in an attempt to protect his self-image.

19

A third concept necessazy to understand Roger's thought ·is "the

need for positive regard.". The need for positive regard involves the
social prerequisites that ara necessary if a person .is to 8l"'W, feel,
and perceive the world "extensionally" or in ~erma or reali'ti".

Un-

conditional positive regard, or acceptance, in this sense, does not
connote approval.

Judgment is suspended.

A client is received ps,ychologically if he senses that all that
he is, •tear, despair, insecurity, or anger,' is being admitted
into the experiencing ot the therapist. A person is receiving
unconditional .positive regard when he is beiri.g received; into the
organismic experiencing of the therapist without being misperceived by the secondary distorting and denying operations of"
the cmditions of worth. 20
Because the need for positive regard is a prerequisite for
change, it becamss essential for ~ successful kind of ps.ychotherap,y.

n1

fact, it has been speculated that the particular technique utilized

in psychotherapy is actually less i.1'!lportant than the relationship that

19
Carl T. Rogers and Barry Stevens, Person to Person (New York:
Pocket Book: 1967), p. 9.
20

Browning, p. 113.

·,

:;..

1S
exists between the therapist and the client.

It is the relationsnip

that makes growth and change possible.
.
.
Roge:rs 1 goal in psychotherapy is to free the person from false
standards o;t worth by offering him unconditional acceptance within the
therapeutic relationship (or acceptance that is an unconditional as the
therapist is capable of offering).

As the client gradually accepts the

therapist's acceptance, he is able to admit

former~

forbidden thoUghts

and feelings into his consciousness and is free to make self-actualizing
choices. ·
To summarize, psychological thought has moved from an idea of
ma~

as a biologically determined being (Freud), to a

soci~

deter-

Mined being (:Boisen and Mowrer), to a. being that is characterized by
a nee~ to grow as an individual and in relation to others (Rogers).
However, Rogers leaves two inportant questions open: what is the source
of man's need to grow and what is the goal ot his grbWth?

R<>gers sqs

that· the need to grow stems from an actualization· tendency and the goal
of actualization is socialized autonOllzy'.

In both cases, he is detining

the ~ource and the goal by the:-process.

lii later chapters of this stud;y

1·1e

will suggest that these two questions springing from a psychological

thao:ry may require theological a.."'lswers.

A Question of Conscience
1h ps,ychoan~tic literatu!e, the conscience was considered to
be the conscious part of the superego.

Since guilt was considered to

be a s,ymptam, the ~ to free a person from the pain of guilt-feelings
~:as to go after the source.

"Twenty-five years ago, in the heydey of

Freudianism, most psychologists, if they were interested in the phenom.enon of conscience at all, were concerned only to the extent of discovering
21
how to get .rid of it. "
As was mentioned earlier, the superego was seen by Freud as being
a. set of standards internalized out of a sense of fear.

However, there

is another aspect to the superego, the ego-ideal.
Liilked to the same idealization of parental power that led to
identification with perceived value s.ystems of the punishing
parents is still another aspect of the superego. 'lhe egoideal, as it is called, is t.he love side rather than the hate
side, of ear~ relationships with the parents ••• 22
Ih a heal~, mature person the"standard set b,y the ego-ideal is
positive and . realistic reSI,ll ting ~ congr'..letlce.

But the. ego-ideal can

set a standard th~t is unattainable and unrealistic and,. when a person
continual]¥ fails to live up to this standard, the result can be d~

21

l1o..,:rer, "1eaming Behavior and Behavior Therapy," Handbook of
Clinic;al Psychology (N3rTYork: }!cGrat-t, 1965), p. 244.

22
Tiobert J. Campbell, rrsuperego anj Conscience," in Conscience:
Its Fr,;edom and Limitations, ed. William C. Bier, S.J. (New York: Fordham,
Univer3ity Press, 1971),p. 85.
16

.

·1>

17
pression and loss of self-esteem.

The ego uses various strategies to

protect itself from the guilt-producing feelings provoked by the
super•ego.

At the extremes, these~ strateg-ies can appear as sociopat."'lic

behavior or scrupulosi t:.r.
Boisen sat-1 conscience as a set of standards internalized out of
a need to be accepted by a group.

Hoffman agrees that conscience. is

formed out of the experience o! relationship.

Fear and genuine guilt

"•• .should not
viewed
. .: . . .,be '.
. . . as ::;enarate
. ..
:. realities,
~23
. . but rather
. as positiQns
.
along a spectru.."'Tl of relationships ••• 11
l.

The recognition of the gen';sis of fear and' its relation to guilt,·
however, points to a reali t:y which is extremely important, namely,
to the fact that love is the fou."ldation ot all mora1i ty; that a
truly moral conscience cannot arise without the experience of a
loving relationship even if it be an ambivalent one. 24
Although Boisen sees

m~L 1 S

conscience as being largely deterodned

by rela.tionship,·pe 'rejects the idea of conscience as a static set of

values.

The standards change as the· relational gr011ps change, even

though the influence of the primary relational group (the parents) remains strong.

T11e :i.nnuence· of

the

relational group is mitigated by

the influence or 'an ideal (or, perhaps, idealized) group -

a:

kind

ot

social equivalent . of the ego-ideal.
But

t~

ethical

id~als

2.3

(F~ll,

and standards

whi~h

are thus impla"lted

Hof.fm.•m, nGuilt, Aspiration and the Free Self, 11 Humani tas
1969): p. 1)2.

24
Ibid.'

·p.

132.

5
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b.1 parents and childhood experiences are not fixed and rigid
except in pathological cases. Conscience is not just backwardlooking. It lies rather ••• on the growing edge of hll!Tlml nature ••••
And the ideals or standards bjr which we judge ourselves are
determined not so nmch by the groups to which we have belonged
as by that to which we aspire, not so much by the yesterdays
as by the tomorrows. 25
The psychological theories of Freud, Boisen, and others, tend

-

toward an emotive concept of conscience, i.e., a definition of con..
~
science as n~ •• a distinctive sentiment or mode of feeling."
Philosophy and theology have tended to see conscience ~n cognitive terms.

is a decision and, -t.herefore, is controlled by the will_.

influenced by both the emotions and the intellect.

Sin

The wiU is

Since conscience re-

sides in the intellect, it is the intellect that must override the
emotions and dominate the will if the person is to avoid si;n.
ing

quo~tion

The .f'ollow-

glves an example of this defini tiori of. ccnscience:

.

In the final analysis this is just what sin is: will and emotiOn
rebelling agtrl,nst the influence of God in the mind •••• Shallow
thinking is tlie ·worst enemy of the (hristian desirl~ God 1 s will
in his life, beca11se thi$ is powerless to ma:intain the mind's
necessary dominanoe over will and snotions. 2?

The danger arises, according to McNeil, when man·seeks to
objectify a 51stem of ethics.

The result becomes a rigid structure .of

25

Boisen, p. 176.

26
John A .Dine.en, S.J., 11Freedom of Conscience in a Philosophical
Pez-s::,e~tive, 11 in Conscience: Its Freedom a11d Limitations, p. 102.

27

o.

Quentin Hyder, M.D., The Christian's Handbook of Psychiatzz

( Cld Tapp.m,~ N.J.: Ravell, 1971), p.

43.
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laws necessitating a judicial approach to the interpretation of moral
situations.
d

. All objectivized systems, especially the traditional idea of an
ethics based on natural law, depend on the presupposition that
man possesses a static, unchanging substantial nature. as souree
of his actions. Such an idea has the advantage of rendering
possible a moral philosophy of necessary, universal; and absolute principles. However, an overemphasis on these qualities
of an objective system can lead, and has led to a systematic
misunderstanding of the existent person as such, and tends to
deliver Ill8n !rom the ult:im.ate risk of his freedom, which ishis grande~. 28
McNeil belieVes that the concept of conscience, to be understood
accurately, requires a dynamic view of :man.

His idea of man is very

much like that of Carl Rogers' - ma..?'l is characterized by growth in relation to other men.

Ha.."l 1 s goal in this sense is to become h:im.self and

the criterion for judgment, therefore, is his own authenticity.
To be true mea.?'ls to become that "'t'lhic..li. one really is. It
represents a s.earch for all the necessary conditions of ,interior
self-adequation, a search from within self-consciousness for
the me~ing and direction or man's freely willed activity ••••
Conscience within this perspective is a developing form of selfawareness¥ it i·s to be u.."lderstood as tl;le deepest self-cmsciou.sness
of man insofar as it acts as a pmver of discrimination, deciding
in every ch-oice what will promote authentic sel.fhood and what Will
stand in its way. Nan on the noral level is characterized by
self•development. He perceives ever,r choice as a cha.ice between
authentic or inauthentic humanity. 29

28
John J. Mclieil, S.J., "Freedom of Conscience in Theological
in Conscience: Its Freedom cmd Limitations, p. 112.

Pel~s_?ective 1 "

29

'

.

Ibid., pp 113 and 120.
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The existence of a "good" conscience in a person is dependent
on a clear vision of self.

Man has the power to "look within himsel£
':.
30
·and decide ·what kind of sel£ he .will be. n
This ability entails
congruence, openness, trust.

It presupposes an essential freedom -

one is able to act in a way that promotes self-fulfillmEilt, one is not
destined to react in

~

predetermined manner.

The k~ presupposition ••• is an attitude of openness, ot trust
in life. One acts to achieve self-fulfillment; one must bel~ve.
that by means of commitment one can achieve that self-fulfillment •
• • •}Ioral evil represents the refusal to be onesel£; moral goOd,
a sincere seeking of self-t"ulfillment. 31
Again, the prerequisite for actualization is socializ~tion.

In

order to have developed a sense of selfhood, the self-awareness that
McNeil terms conscience, one must have experienced positive relationships.
Conscience, interpreted as self-awareness, cannot be seen in isola~ion.
A person is able to decide only in relation to others.

McNeil concludes

that conscience (self-awareness) " ••• is transposed into love itself."
Guilt, which was defined as the refusal to grOT...r, becomes "the refusal

32

to be for others."

Conscience, formed in relationship, moves in-

exorably tram love to love.

"Ideal spiritual adulthood for the conscience

"1-iCuld consist ln this: that the compass of love would point the direction
so unfalteringly that 'the external law is no longer needed.u

33

30
C. Fitzsimmons Allison, Guil-t, .An;er & God (New York: Seabury
Press, 1972}, p. 23.

Ji
McNeil, p. 116.
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A Question of Acceptance
Guilt, which for Freud was~a s,ymptom, became the source of social
disharmony in Boisen's theories.

Hith Rogers' theories of actualization

and socialization, the distinction between true and false guilt becomes
more

apparen~.

To

p~sist

in a sense qf

~~lt

is to refuse to grow.

'When one experiences a sense of guilt, one is aware that he .has done
something that.. is not in harmony with his

01-m

self-image.

becomes aware of the aot whic~ P.recipitated t.hts s.ense
cernes aware, of a contradiqtion in his arm personalicy.
contradiction has been

described~

o.t

As a person
guilt, he be-

This painful

Paul in Romans 7:14-20.

In order

to overcame this contradiction, one must grow into a more realistic
unde:-standing of self.
However, as Rogers points out, the prerequisite for actualization
is acceptance.

A person defines himself in relation to others.

not accept himself if he has not first been accepted by others.

One canThis

acceptance (or positive regard) must be founded in truth if it is to be
real acceptance.

Tl:e process of rationalization intrinsic to sin de-

strO".rs the fabric of truth that makes relationship

possibl~.

Sinmltane-

ously, rationalization destroys the truth that makes self-acceptance
possible.

The pain of guilt is the pain of a person who can no longer

accept the reali t;y of who he is.
If true guilt is the betr3.Yal of t~e truth of what one is, false

gui:t denies that the truth exists.

False guilt involves identi~ and

pres:.nes that acceptance has never been experienced (or that t.'le ex-.:

21

/
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perience has been distorted or was inadequate.)

The person with a false

sense of guilt is not concerned -vg.th a bad deed, but with a sense of
being a bad person.
Guilt is never entirely true as no decision is ever entirely
free.

However, neither is guilt ever entirely false.

Even in the

pS,Ychotic there remains a 'core' that is not determined by a false selfimage or perception of reality.
hope of recovery for the person.

If this were not so, there would be no

Congruence and incongruence ~xist

side by side in ·each person, and any attempt to resolve guilt mu-st deal
·.-dth both aspects.

CHAPTER II
FALSE GUTI.T - A !1ATTER OF IDENTITY
Conditiofial Badness
The difference between conditonal badness and neurotic guilt
is one of degree rather than kind.

Both involve a sense of identit,y.

Conditional b~dne13§ is experienced '.:hen_ one. feels himself to be an
acceptable, lovable person only after he has won the approval of
'

another.

'

'

Approval is won through 'right' actions, and, therefore,

moral! ty becomes the price one p.:zys to maintain a sense. of worth.
This approval should not be confused 'With the acceptance discussed in the previous chapter.

Acceptance is the positive regard

or prizing of the whole person.

Approval involves a ju~ent forcing

morality to become the palm in an elaborate game, the object of which
is to maintain a sense of worth which insures survival.
this kind of rnorali ty

rr cheap

France terms

morality, rr as opposed to costly or genuine

morality which del'llands growth.

''A genuine moral concern demands. that I

lJ~re my enemy; a cheap morality demands that I PW attention to the
1
opinions of my friends instead. 1t
i..

' ,.

1

.··,

There is, perhaps, a little of this kind of guilt in ever,rone,

1

Halcolm France, The P·'Iradox of Guilt: a Olristian
urch Press,

.?;elJ..ef of Self-Hatred (Philadelphia: United

2.3

'

a feeling that someone is keeping score.

f

Condi.ticnal badness is a

childish approach to moralit,y marked by a lack of a sense or worth~
or a developed sense of identity.

The immature person tends to be more

concerned with the possibility of punishment than with the motives under~ing his actions.

mdaning of accident.

A child, for instance, has little sense of the
Breaking a cup by accident is as immoral as punch-

ing a plqmate in the stomach - and more so if the mother discovers the
shattered cup but misses the violence wrought on the playground.

Toumier

points out that someihing of this association of guilt with accident re.
2
mains in each adult, "a kind of latent, unconscious, yet tearful guilt."
The person who is trying to win acceptance by being good is~ of
CO'.lrse, doomed to disappointment.
one can earn heaven.

One can no more.- earn acceptance than

Conditional badness can be thought or as a kind or

P~J'cholcgical Pelagianism.

The person acting out or a sense of condition-

al ba~~ess is actual~ searching for unconditional love, but his actions
necessarily put conditions on that love and, therefore, whatever. he receives in terms of love and acceptance will be inadequate.

He places

conditions on the acceptance he seeks from others because he feels. that
he is essentially a bad person and not worth l·oving.

"As an adult he

vlill always be looking for approval from his friends, but he cannot
~dn it from himself.

His position is ver'!J paradoxical; he is inviting

2
p.

42.

Paul Tournier, Guilt an:i Grace (New York: Harper & Row, 1962),

. +
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others to love what he secretly cc>nnot love."

3

Eventually, the experience of acceptance can make the need for
approval less urgent, but, to the degree .that acceptance has not been
experienced, childish needs can became adult neuroses.

3

Fran·~e,

p. 60.

.;,.

Neurotic Guilt
To persist in a __ sense of guilt is to refuse to g_row, to conscious•
1y deny the truth of one's ~ being.

When one experiences a sense of'

false guilt, however, one acts because of a false self-image.
is not the result of an act.

The image

A person who has experienced acceptance can

grow in self-awareness and in a~areness of the needs of others.

However,

if because of childhood experiences, a person fails to grow into a
realistic awareness of himself (Neurosis), the person may become convinced
that he is an evil person and act accordingly'.

In other. cases,_ :the per-

son may be con.,inced that if he doesn't follow certain .rigiq formulas,
he will certainly became an evil person.

This is false or neurotic guilt.

Like true guilt, it is the result of a failure to perceive oneself realistically.

However, in the case of neurotic guilt, this failure is conditioned

rather

~~an

the result of a deliberate decision.

Until someone invents or manufactures perfect p~rents, there will
be imperfect, painful childhood experiences.

These e;x.periences, .repressed

or etched in vivid memories, are like~ to form
and incongruence.

the basis for neurosis

Everyone is a little neurotic and, to repeat what

was stated in Chapter One, guilt always involves both decision and
identity.
False or nJurotic guilt is also known as pervasive guilt.
-·--··~------~----

26

It is

27
often experienced as "an agonizing conviction that oneself is essential~

4

Because of .tlrls belief ~hat one is essential~ bad, one will

bad."

act in a way that provokes punis.'1ment.

T'.ne person experiencing a true

sense of guilt suffers from it after the co~~ssion of an act.

The

person suffering from pervasi 78 g~1il t feels bad all of the time and Will
act cut t.hese feelings in order to give his suffering a concrete cause
and in order to incur punishment.

"Pervasive guilt drives its victims

to wrongdoing while normal guilt results from wrongdoing. "

5

The person feels g;1il ty beca'..lse he has been rejected and has
interpreted that rejecticn as punis~~ent.
equation goes like this:

11

According to SChneiders, the

I am uorthless, bad, and evil (since I am

6

rejected); but only the guilty are bad and evil; therefore, I am guilty. n
Isolation and guilt (true a~d false) are close~ related.

In the

case of t:rn..1e guilt, a person becomes isola. ted as a result of his actions.
With false guilt, the isolation is a source of the feelings of guilt.
never having been accepted, the person is unable to reach beyond his
own pain to a.cce~t others.

"Hany people feel their loneliness to be an

4
George A. Bensen, H. D. J T:-~.en Joy Breaks Through (New York:
Press, 1972), ,. 30 •

s~~a!JU!'".f
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:;

Ibid.:, p. 29.

6
Ala."'(a.nder A. Schneiders, "The Nature and Origins of Guilt, 11
Ihrr.:-<:1itas 5 (Fall, 1969): 180.
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aecusation in itself; they think that others would have succeeded in
retaining frlands where they have_ failed.

To be isolated is to be

7
guilty alread;y' •••• "
The mature (congruent) person can cope with both separation and
involvement.

He can make a distinction between solitude and isolation;

he sees involvement as a means to self-discovery and not an escape.
Jager sees neurosis in general, and neurotic guilt in particular~
as a means of coping with isolation.

One tries to control isolation

by being a bad person and thus "being the author of••• isolation."

"I

will accuse nvself o£ eve:ry wrong-doing, of lack of will or of stupidicy

in order to hide from

~self

that ~ stagnation, ~ repetition of~-

self, :my despair, my emptiness is in the reality the absense of others."
Two of the

distin~~ishing

characteristics of depression are a

sense of isolation and a sense of helplessness.

The person needs to be

able to act for himself, but first he needs to be accepted (not directed)
by others.

Jager maintains that depressives use false guilt as a means

to isolate themselves from others and avoid change.
In the world of the depressive, guilt spins around its own axis
because in tr~t world the ver,y possibility for change is missing.

7
France, p. 17.

8
Bernd Jager, "Dread and Guilt in Philosophy and Clinical
S (Fnll, 1969): 167.

Practice, 11 Hu..7!lanita.s

8
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That fundamental possibility is another persan •••• The essential
and primar,y fact of the world of the depressive is that it is
closed off from others and that it has excluded others. 9

.,,'

9
Thid., p. 163.
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Scrupulosity
Conscience in the scrupulou<:s person, rather. than be:i.ng a seltal.rctreness that invites growth and development, has become a rigid set
of rules· that impede development.

Scrupulosity is a "defect in person-

ality, and thus a defect in conscience.

In the scrupulous person the
10

superego has become too rigid, literal and intlexible."

The person

becomes caught up·in a rigid set of rules and loses his capacity to
reel or think

free~.

The scrupulous person and the sociopath (who will be discussed
belm~) are polar opposites in many ways, although both are extreme

eX<¥71ples of false guilt.

The scrupulous person, uriiike the sociopath,

often comes from a stable home with

relative~

happ,y

f~ai~

backgrdund.

He is an obedient child and a model student who is vert eager to please
and very dependent on others for approval.

Rather than act out his

anger or sexual feelings as the sociopath does, he will_ repress them..
'.

''The scrupulous child tends to over-intellectualize, is over-controlled,
11
inhibited, and coristrictive."
Weisner lays much of the blame for the development of scrupulosity
in children on .the Catholic schools where children were taught sex is

10

i-layne A. Weisner, "Abnormalities in the Development of Conscience,"
in Ccm,;cience: Its Freedom and Limi tattons, p. 6).
11

Ibid., P•

64.
30
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bad before they knew what it was.

Most children, when ccnfronted with

sanething
they don't
understand,
mll simply
ignore it.
.
..
.
.

Therefore., the

dire warnings of the evils of impurity 'in thought, word, and deed'
£lew harmlessly over their heads.

However, the scrupulous child., who

is anxious, contused, and lacks natural spontaneity will take every
word to heart and will develop elaborate mechanisms to combat. his growing sense o£ guilt.

One solution may be to transfer all

responsibili~

£or action to an authority figure, so that the burden o£ guilt and
potential guilt is lifted.

In adults this mechanism becanes the

12
11

external conscience. 11
False guilt often serves as a mask or facade for the person's

persistence in a sense of true guilt, which is the re.tu.sal to grow.
vleisner has found t.hat in children and adolescents, scrupulosity masks

an inability to accept sexual roles and independence.

In adolescents, resolution of the probla~ of scrupulosity seems
to go h~~d-in-hand with acceptance of and adjustment to newfound femininity or masculinity. Toward the conclusion o£ treatment, these children begin to behave more like typical teenagers.
They begin to engage in normal social activities with the opposite
sex •••• This might be another way of saying that they were helped
to develop a sense of identity and independence. They became
secure and mature enough ·to rea.ch a decision and act upon it. 1.3

i2
John J. Pot-rell, S.J., "Guilt," St. Anthony's Messanger 82
(J."n"'
~· -· ~

1974): 37.
13
Weisner, p. 69.
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Growth and development always happen in relation to others.
r morality

1

The .

that prevents the scrupulous person from developing al.so pre-

vents him from relating to others in any mea.nil}gful way.·
I refer to people for whom the necessar.r ethical dimension of
life, .without which we are not truly human, has sanehow become
a burden which lessens their capacity to respond freely, loving:cyand creative~ to that ver,r humanness in themselves and others
which the moral imperative is supposed to safeguard. So encumbered are they with the necessity to be moral that they have
lost the capacity to be loving. 14

14
Hoffman, p. 126.

.
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Sociooathic Behavior
On

the

opposite pole .frofu the scrupulous person is the psycho-

pathic or sociopathic personality.

rn

British p-sychology, the term

is psychopath; in American psychology, the term is sociopath and is a
type

of" acting

Oll.t

neurotic.

pr6bleiil remains the sa'l'!l~.

Although the terms may change., the

The sociopath is a person without conscience

who, apparently, is incapable of experiencing guilt.
In terms of chil~~ooj experience, there are a number of causes

of sociopathic beh.'3.vior.

Barring serious brain damage, the causes all

revolve around a sense of being a bad person and a need to incur puniShment.

Craft suggests that a false sense of guilt may be caused by

severe rejection,
interested par~nt.

u~~al~

involving one hostile parent and one dis-

Another possibility may be a combination of mild

rejection and mild dar.t..'1ge to the brain area (probably the hypothalamus).

15

It is also possible that the person may assume the guilt of his
parents. He may have witnessed the evil his parents have done, perhaps .
in tei'!lls of ·hostility toward each other or towards him, and the child
wtll not be able to ace~pt the fact that these people, his parents, who
are the center of his existence, could act in such a manner.

Instead,

he :Till prefer to believe that he is the source of evil, taking the

15
John Craft, ed., PSif:chopathic Disorders (New York: Pergammon,

1966), p. 68.
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3b
guilt of his parents upon himself.
The person suffering this~kind of false guilt will tend to
act out in wqs that will force others to punish him.

He creates crisis

situations that provoke reactions of anger and rejection.

"Unresolved

guilt creates a need to make amends, to make restitution, to suffer
enough to pay back what is amiss, to set things 'right' by damage to

16

self and thus balance the 'crime' •

11

.

As Menninger points out, sane

of these actions are really "lifesavers. 11

Forcing others to i~ict

punishment relieves the "guilty" person of the necessity of punishing

17

himself.
1"he sociopath may be hurt and/or angered by the response of
others, but eventually he ~ divo:rce the response from the original
act that provoked it.

He will start to expect hostility and rejection,

lies and betrey-al, as a matter of course.

vJhile the fabric of a normal

person's world is woven with truth and trust, the sociopath's world is
a paranoiac tangle of suspicion and fear.
Guilt tends to rob the self of aQy sense of well-being and does
not allow us to enjoy fully our health, wealth, and well-being
while we have them. It leads us to expect misfortune, the mal;.
functioning of machines, hostility from people. And what we
expect becomes a factor in evoking what we receive. 18

i6
Allison, p. 12.

~,..,.,,,
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Karl Menninger, Whatever 13e-J<Jme of Sin? (New York: Hawthorn,
p. 88 •
18
Allison, p. 12.
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Another characteristic of the sociopath is that he acts out of
impulse.

His actions are never pyemeditated, but rati1er are in response

to the pressures and needs of the mcrnent.

Dorothea McCarthy, in her

article on formation of conscience, mentions the relationship betli"een
the abilit.y to defer immediate rewards and trust.
The 't-rell-cared for infant learns very early that 't-Then his mother
is there, making certain sounds in getting his bottle ready, he
will be fed, and that everJthing will be all right. The child
thus learns to wait and trust his mother, and in so doing he
also learns to deter i~~ediate gratification of his desires. 19.
The sociopath has neYer learned to wait or to trust others.

He

recognizes standards of right and wrong but only in terms of possible
puniShment.

Predictably, his relationships are shallow and

exploitativ~.

He k-nct.,rs the difference beti-reen right and wrong. Any anxiet.y or
depression that he might feel is the result of having been caught
or exposed, or the fear of it, not the result of the actio~ itself
•••• He rarely loves deeply and almost never allows himself to became involved in a meaningful love realtionship with anyone. 20

't

19
Dorothea HcCarthy, "Development of the Normal Conscience,"
in Consciencs: It's Freedom a"1d Limitations, p.

20
Hyder, p. 87.
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_The Relationship of True Guilt to False Gtdl t
Returning to Rogers, man is a being who needs to grow and needs
to be accepted ( socialized autonomy).
can be a conscious refusal to gror1.

A persistent sense of guilt

The person with a false sense of

guilt has also stopped growing and is using guilt itself as a means to
avoid the necessity of grO'W7Jl.

The scrupulous person sees guilt lurking

around ever,y corner,; the sociopath is unaware that guilt exists except
in punish.'"llent.

Both are -oblivious to the people around them.

The inability to love is the key to the problem of false guilt.
The person who is suffering from trtle guilt may refuse. to love, but
the person who is suffering from a false sense or guilt cannot love.

In

the process of growing to p~Jchological matur1 ty, the persatlearns to
tra.'lscend himself, to love unselfishly.

He can do this irisofar as he

has acquired a realistic image of himself as a loving and loved creature.
But the person'' Who is experiencing raise guilt has stopped growing - he
is fixated at an earlier stage.

AlthoUgh his

words mey

indicate the

opposite, he ·Will. feel that he is essentially· evil and the only kind of
love or nurturing he should or can have is punishment. · Ver,y often the
person with a false sense oj guilt will use it as a mask to avoid confronting

tr~e

guilt.

Thus a 'false guilt' seems likely to blanket a 'true guilt' and
to drmv its implacable venom therefrom ••• this true guilt cons~sted in a certain refusal to develop, to assu."lle fall selfhood
or total responsibility in a given situation. 21

21

Tournier, p.

65.

J6
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One illustration of

~ha qyna~cs

of the true-false guilt re-

lationship is the student who is making very bad grades or is flunking

-.

out ·of school.

Alli$on says if you· show him a student who is flunking

out, he'll show you a student w:it.b a false";sense 9f,guilt - probably
towards his_parents.

A college chaplain, who is an old acquaintance, insists that he
has known no stud~nt to fail merely for academic reasons. "They
all had an emotional need to fail. They flunk out because. of ·
some deep and usually unconscious need to fail." Incident~, .
this phenomena is quite often related to the sense of guilt which
the student has about his relationship with hies parents. 22
Or. the surface, it app-;ars that the student is experiencing a

false or neurotic sense of t;:.ti.lt.
needs to be

p~~ished.

He has an idea that he is evil and

Therefore, he

fl~~s

out of school forcing his

parents to punish hi.-n.

However, on a deeper level, the student is also

masking a true sense of

~uilt

resulting from his refusal to

g~i.

People grow to maturit'J as naturally as a plant grows towards sunshine.
If a person refuses to take the next step to maturity, be will pay a

high price ·ror his denial of self.

The student might pre.fer the wrath

of an angry parent to the discove:rJ that he is capable of being a
successful, lovable person apart from his parents.
Excessive driru{ing (including alcoholism), drug abuse, sexual
promiscuity, shoplifting and: other forms of theft (the "rip-off'i), all
e:T these can be forms of false guilt into which a person escapes to

av-o.id ·the necessity of real gro·..;th.

22
A.llison, p. 12.
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CHAPTER III
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL

RESOLUTia~

OF GUILT

What It Means to Say "I'm Sorry"
Guilt that is unrecognized or ignored is essentially selfdestructive.
or eying.

Living things are rarely stagnant; they are either growing

To persist in a sense of guilt in the face of acceptance is·

essentially self-destructive.

Therefore, it is necessar.Y for a therapist

to deal with the problem of guilt, not out of a desire to

impos~

a

particular ethical standard, but because guilt, as a self-destructive
force, is opposed to the principle of life and the healing process.
It is not for the analyst to}lecide what is sinful for his
.
patient or what he should do about it. The psychoanaqst believes that the qualities of aggression and self-destruction
are evil, and this he can point out wit.'lout charging the patient
with moral turpitude, or camnitting him to a ~ecific obligation,
or himsel.f (the analyst) to an esoteric or specific code •. Why are
aggression and self-destruction prL~a facie evils for.the ps,ychoana~st to single out? Because both are opposed to the life
principle, to· the healing of the patient's disorganization .and
distress.
1
Menl'linger picks up, many of Mawrer' s ·ideas regarding guilt a.e a
self-destructive force.

Real. guilt that is not ·acknowledged is., accord-

ing to 11owrer, the primary source of neurosis and psychosis.
to 1 i.ve,

Irtan

needs to grow as much as he needs to breath.

guilt rc.b s man of his life.

1

!{enninger, p. 23.
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In order

Unacknowledged ./

39
If it proves eir.pirically trJ.e that certain forms of conduct

characteristically lead human beings into emotional instability',
what better or firmer basis would one Hish for labeling such conduct as destructive, self•de£eating, evil, sintul? ••• there is,
·surely, no disposition on the part of anyone to hold that sin
as such, necessarily deans a person to inteminable suffering in
the form of neurosis or psychosis. The presumption is rather
that sin has this effect only where it is acutely tel t but not
ackn&...rledged and corrected. 2

'•

Denial· is a cotn:::lon way of dealing with guilt.

One attempts· to

get rid of it by insisting that it doesn 1 t exist and by trying to atfirm
freedan.

However, amoral 'freedom' is valueless and

to be synoeymous with 'worthless. 1
1

1

valueless 1 tends

The person who insists on his total

freedom' whil.e refusing to ackn v.·rl edge guilt is saying that he is not

1;orth struggling for - there is no ideal or vision of self against whiCh
11

to measure action.

L'1 becoming a.>1oral, ethically neutral, a."l.d

1

free,'

1-1e have cut the very roots of our being; lost our deepest sense of selfhood and identit,r; and, with neurotics themselves, find ourselves asking:

'

3

I,

The abil:ity to say
truth about oneself.

1

I'm sorey' is the abili t.r, to recoghize the

It is recognition of self as valuable and worth'

, I

1·ihila.· · Hoitever,

.,. ,

ne one ever Sa.ys · '!'m· sor:ry- 1 bt hi.n!Self,.' . The 'Words
'

.

'~

'

·•.:

'.

'

~

that confirm one's o-;-m sense of self-worth must be spoken to another

It, j_s only b8cause of this restored sense of worth - restored

2

MD!.,rrer, The Crisis in Psychiat:g al"ld Religion, pp.

J
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..

relation to another - that the person is able to accept himself.

The

process of reconciliation involv~,s reconciliation with one9elt as well
as with others.

It guilt is to be healed, the victim must be reconciled to himself. Were his feelings main~ outgoing, there would be little
problem if he felt nothing but grief at the damage which he had.
caused to others, reconciliation with them would follow easi~.
He would have no hesitation .in saying 1 I'm sorry.' But because
his feelings are usually complicated by inner remorse and selfrejeoticn, reccnciliaticn becoines difficult ••• 2
Confession, repentance, apology are all attempts· to
realistic vision of self.

It is the acceptance or one's

and even the valuing or prizing of them.
refuses to look at the truth.

res~re

v"'

a

limita~ions

A persistent sense

or

guilt

/

The person acknowledges, the fact t.ruit

a sin has been committed but does not, see the fact that he can be both
a sinner and. saved.

False guilt is a kind of moral ~qopia. . :Biebauakas

says that the inability to accept one's whole beina, limitations as
well as virtues, is characteristic of the

;

neurotic.~-'·

. There i.s a c;:loUbt in the mind of some• authors whether· a neurotic
is real~ accepting guilt as a part of his personalit.y. Goppert
(1960), dealing with a new approach to obsessive-cO!Ilpulsive
neurosis,. expressed this idea in suggesting that the basic
diffiqulty: in neurosis was failure to accept one's own limitations , ./
and thus to adjust within the framework of these limitations. ·3
To say 'I'm sorry' is also to abandon atter.pts to manipulate

2
France, p. 20.

J
Vytautas J. Biebauskas, "Shifting of the Guilt Feeling in the
Process of Psychotherapy," Pap•'!r given to t..'-le Internt?.tional Congress
on Group Pszchotherapy, Hil::L'rl, Italy, July, 1963, p. 8.

. ....
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people.

The person who has a sense of guilt may substitute manipulation

for relationship.

To some extent-:. the guilty person .has destroyed the

truth that made relati.onship possible.

For the guilt-ridden person,

manipulation is not just a reaction in a particular time or place.

It

has become a way of life.
Manipulation in such a.. general sense is or becanes not merely _the
sum of whate!ve:r dis ere te games (in Berne's sense) a man has played
in relation to particular people on particular occasions. It is
instead a pervading style, a vi~ll-grounded, emPirical though otten
unarticulated philosophy of human relations. SuCh a style frequently coeXists with a profound distrust of oneself ah.d of
others, and contr-i":::u. tes to a great dislike of oneself •. 4
Finally, the statJ:nent

1

I'm sorry, •· as it attempts to restore

truth, relationship, and a sen~e of self-acceptance, also signals abelief in the pos3ibility of forgiveness and_change.

No one says 'I'm

sorry: unless there is :t10pe of forgiveness - if not. by the person injured, then by

~omeone

~Vhen

confessor.

representing that person - a. friend, theragist,

genuine guilt, which can be the refusal to grcm.t is

acknowledged in repentance, it is
"Ge.~:rine

tr~~sformed

into possibility.

guilt reveals itself in a world of possibilities and the guilty

persc::l avails himself of these possibilities in order to effect recti-

fication.

Only within a v1orld of such possibilities can he hope for

forgi-veness.

5
11

4
Sl:ostrom, 1'}1anipulation and Guilt, 11

5

Jager, p. 162.

Hu.·~1:anitas

5

(Fall, 1969):

v

What It Me11ns to Be Forgiven
Forgiveness is a word or gesture that recognizes the truth and
Horth of the other.

In the recognition of that truth the possibility-

of dialogue is restored.

Thus the expression of forgiveness is the

experience of the restoration of relationship.

The

abili~J

to grow ·

er:1erges in relationship and with it the possibility of love is renewed,
both for the one who forgives and the one who is forgiven.
ca.'"l transform the guilty and guiltless equally.

Forgiveness

"For the a:ct of loving

another gives life to the lover as well as to the cne loved, and to
spea.'i{ t.he word of love is to be loved as well as to love. n

6
And to

speak the word of forgiveness is to be forgiven as well as to forgive.
"Ma'rl becomes man in personal encounter. 11

7
Man realizes his

~~

lizni tations in encounter and tries to raach past them in dialogue.
ParadoxicaJJ.y, it is in the recognition of limitation {fi'm sor:cy"') and
the restoration of dialogue (forgiveness) that the limitaticns are themselves overcome and ma..Yl becomes truly free.
But what is here generally overlooked, it seems, is that recovery (constructive change, rede..-npt:.ion) is most assuredly
attained, not qy helping a person reject and rise above his
sins, but by helping him accept them. This is the paradox
1-vhich we have not at all understood a...'"ld ivhich is the ver-.1
cl1Ux o:f the prabiem: ••• the moment he ••• begins to accept his

6
Reule Howe, The Hiracla of Dialogue (Nel.v York: Seabury Press,

1963), P• 6.
7

·-

Ihtd., p. 66.
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guilt and his sinfulness, the possibility of radical refo~ation
opens up; and with this, the individual may legitimately, thoa.gh ·' ·
not without pain and effort, pass from deep, pervasive self. rejectial and Self-torture td a nGN' freedom, of self-respect and .
peace. 8
·
The restoration of truth not only involves the recognition of and
responsibility for action, it also inv6lves the ability- to accept
thoughts and emotions

3.S ~.:trt Of oneself~

]it the case

false guilt_,

'0£

self-acceptance restores the person's ability to think and feel freely.
.

.

'

It is no longer

necessR~J

.

to repress

'

·: ~~

':

w~ard ~~oughts

and emotions as

evil and threatening.
Like angry, frightened children, thoughts and feelings which a~e
honestly accepted, can be loved, and in love their natural development is reestablished. Eventually, irrespective of their original
malfunction, they can become valued members of one's psychic
family. 9
Forgivene~s rest~res

t}J.e per.son to a sense .

?f peace and harmony.

It is no longer necassa.r.r. to repress or act out guilt feelings if the
..

actual source of
tightens

th~
••

•

guil~

has been confronted and forgiven.

v-reb of lies
,>

•

..

~

;:~nd

manipulation;

• '

•

forgiven~ss

.

~

'

Repression

gently releases
'

•

•

the g:1.!.l ty persun f:rom t.he \-leb and restores a sense of peace that is
b(;t.:.'l. free and secure.

Finally, forgi~eness does not simply restore one's abilit,y ·toreJ.c1te to the person uho forgives.

Forgiveness restores and strengthens

a
1-Iowrer, The Crisis in Pqchiatrz and R3ligton, p.

9
Benson, p.

35.

54.

.

one's ability to relate to ever.rone.

.

Browning points· out that acceptance

in the therapeutic model is representative acceptance.· If the therapist's acceptance only involved the therapist himself, the clie.nt' s
relationship with the therapist might improve, but his general condition would remain the same.

However, the aim of psychotherapy is

to change the patient's life, not just a single relationship.
In brief, the therapist's empathic acceptance announces, proclaims, and id tnesses to the fact that the client is truly
aceeptable, not only to him as a therapist, but to some
structure which transcends all finite referents, i.e., -to the
universe and whatever power holds it together. And, simila;rly, _
the client does not come to feel that he is acceptable simply
to the therapist,. b'.lt accepts the fact that he is acceptable
in an ontological sense. 10
The key to successful psychotherapy in Rogers 1 model is the
recognition of the worth and dignity of the person.
supposition to all successful therapy.

This is the pre-

Similarly, forgiveness

recognizes and restores a person to a position of worth.

One must

then take the next step and nsk not only wr~t it me&~s to be forgiven,
but why is forgiveness possible.
~~d forgiveness?

How is it possible to offer acceptance

Browning's answer is the recognition that our stan-

d.s.rds are limited and that ultimately a person's worth is based on or

measured by a strtlcture that transcends finite standards.

Rogers h3s contended that the ~~erapist must confront ~~e
client as a person of worth and dignit,r •••• It is a presupposition

10

BrO',..ming, ·p. 150-51.

1/

'

,...,

Ii

LS
to all successful therapy •••• To say that each individual has an
intrinsic worth and dignit,y is to s~y, in addition, that each
individual has it irrespective of particular attitudes whiCh
fellow h~'Wls ,may hold towa~ him. It. sugS,ests that ul. timately
the individual's worth and dignity is measured by a structure
which transcends all finite attitudes. 11
It is at the point of the source of worth, the

possibili~

of

absolute acceptance, that psychology and theology begin to differ •.
While

psy~hology

looks to man for possibilities of growth and accep.tance,
',,

theology finds the source of

.I
I,
I
'

'

'

'

>
'

'·

~

11
Thid., p. 1$1.

acc;~;Jts.nce.

in Christ.

Part II: SAClWiENTAL FORGIVENESS

With the new rite of Penance

(~Penitentiae.,

1973), the

emphasis in the celebration of the sacrament has moved from confession
and atonement to acceptance, dialogue, and reconciliation.

In the

following pages we will examine these three ideas, acceptance, dialogue,
and reconciliation, in light of the therapeutic model

and

implications of these ideas for the new rite of Penance.

explore the

CHAPTER IT.

A THEOLOGY CF ACCEPTAUCE
Acceotance and Guilt
Ih discussing the therapeutic model, we said that the therapist
receives or accepts the client as h,aving

~~sl!ntial

avoids imposing conditions of worth on the client.

worth and dignity and
Browning describes

the si tua'tion of acceptance as an ''active-passive relationship. 11
therapist

active~

The

cares for and values the feelings of the client, but

expresses this concern by passively receiving and accepting the client's
feelings.

At times, the therapist will receive feelings the client can-

not confront or express.

Of course, th.3 therapist's acceptance can never.be fully unconditional, but' Brmming,

Howe,

and ot:"lers ha~re used this model to explain

God's ·unconditional f>..mpa.thie acceptance of man.

God is the being who is

totally· for others,. thas- his aceeptande of· the other· is. unqualified and.
unconditior..al.
In t."le ideal case, there would be nothing that others could do
or say that would cause this individual to withdraw or put
conditions on this capacity empathically to accept and receive
the other. T'nis would be the nature of the ideal instance of
u.."\condi tonal e;,nathic acce-otnnce·. 1

1
Br~~~ing,

pp. 176-77.

47

....
h8
The individual Browning is referring to here is God.

Because

this acceptance springs from the natura of his own heir~ for others,
God must remain unconditionally accepting if he is to be consistent or
congruent wi t.h himself.
Browning compares Rogerian incongruence with sin as it is
described by Irenaeus in his Christus Victor theory· of atonement.

There

i~ an element of idolatr,y in both sin and incongruence insofar as one

is relying on finite values for one's sense of worth.
" ••• absolutizing finite values leads to estrangement."

Moreover,
2

The relation

between guilt and isolation was discussed earlier as was the role guilt
_plays 1.n separating one from the truth of self and others.

Here the

,_

sense of

~strru1gement

Brc~ing

includes not

on~y

self and others, but God.

goes 011 to qompar.e incongruence with Irenaeus' idea of

..... . ne devil •
The devil offers man false conditions of worth. However,.
~~e devil does not exist independentl~ of God.

off the life-giving energy of God.

He is a parasite livir~

When the devil offers man-false con-

di tiona of worth,· he is simultaneously cutting off man from the source

of his O<J'm life and ener6Y in God.

Similarly, conditions of worth .in

~he thetapeutic model live off man's own capacity to grow, the actual-

iz-ation tendency.

l:f man is to regain his ability to grO'"..r_, he must be

f::.•sed from those false conditions of i-rort:'l robbing him of his O'.m energy
::md

life.

"The p0int is that Iranaeus' concept of the devil and the

2

Br-o•..r.:1il".g, p. 182.

.

·).

Pointing out that Irenaeus insists on maintaining man's freedom,
~~

the possibilit,y of authentic guilt,

fails to maintain freedom.

believes that Rogers

Rogers only identifies two sources of in-

congruence: in troj ect:.on and im.'ilaturi ty.
possibili~

Br~~ing

Thus he seems to ignore t.'lle

of choice.

Brovming's criticism of Rogers is, in this instance, unfounded.
The point of Rogers' therapy is to free people from false standards of
worth and restore their ability to experience and decide freely.
presupposes that a persoa has the capacity to decide.

4

This

Rogers' theories

also maintain that a ,erson can choose to be helped, and can choose to
accept the therapist's acceptance.
In terms of our consideration of guilt, the most important

difference bet1-reen Rogers and Irenaeus lies in the source of growth:
for Rogers, the source is the actualization tendenc.y; for Irenaeus it is
the iJn.a.ge of God in man.

The similarity between them is in their under-

etanding of the nature of guilt:

11 • • •

here

in both theories guilt

em3rges as an inhibitor to change rather than an objective fact that

3
Ibid., P• 183.

4

Rogers and Stevens, p. 21.

condemns the client even if he v.;ere to change •"

Guilt ma;y be imposed

on man as a result of his own deqision (true guilt) or by conditioning
(false guilt); usually it is a·combination 6£both.
acceptance remains the prerequisite for growth.
source of acceptance in the therapeutic model.
acceptance the s_ource is God.

Br~~1ing,

P• 188.

In either case,

The therapist was the
In a theology of

Acceptance and God
One of' the presuppositions underlying the idea of' God's unconditional acceptance of the v:-orld is that God is in relation to the world ..
Browning maintains that God accepts all feelings and yet remains un-

6
changed and una.f.feoted by these feelings.

GOd'' s self-:im.age is to

accept empathically all feelings without· conditions or qualifications -

7
to remain completely for others.
The process of unconditional acceptance is an active/passive
l

.

.

because~

process

as God accepts the feelings of the world, he also con-

.a

veys his "care, concern, love and interest in the l-Iorld."

God's

\:-;

empathic acceptance can be seen from the perspective of creation in that
his accepta.-•1ce allows each new feeling in individuals to come into
existence.

'l'he world is continually new because God lmows the world in
·~

'

"

.

the Biblical, creative sense of the \vord 'knowledge.'

His lmowledge is

also acceptance.

6
Heschel proposes a similar idea in his description of God's

p<?;;thqs, i. e•, God feels the slilffering of his people and yet

remains

f1.lllda1r.entally unchanged. Moltmann points out that this leads to a
dualistic image of God in the sense that there is an exterl'lal God that
feels and an internal God U.'laffected by feeling. According to Moltmann,
only a Trini tarla."l understanding of God can resolve this dile.-·'lll'!la~
A1Jr:Jha:'1'l Hcschel, The Prophets (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), Jurgen
Molt::1ann, The Crucified God {New York: Harper & Row, 1974).

7

Brovming, p. 193.

8
-n...1• d •

.l.l.J

'

p·.

1.

9~
•
.,

Although it may be subject to denial or distortion, man alwqs
senses God's empathic acceptance, even if he is only
subconscious level.

a~are

o£ it on a

This knowledge of the existence of unconditiatal ·.

acceptance is the chief motivating (actualizing) force ~n man and
Browning identifies it as the image of God in man.

On

a conscious

level, however, man tends to react to unconditional aceeptance with
hostility and rejection because man is fighting to maintain bis. own ·
conditions of worth.

God's acceptance must include an acceptance

or

these negative feelings, otherwise, God's acceptance WOUld be mere
"Sentimentaiity is sympat.b.y- baseti on a shallow kriowledge
9
or feeling for the real feelings of the object of.sympathy."
If we

sentimentality.

are to believe that we have indeed been .fu.l1y' accepted - believe to the
point of being able to put aside conditions of worth - and be transformed
into something new, we must be persuaded that these hostile feelings which
we believe to be most unacceptable in us have been accepted.
Browning says that the logical end of all these negative feelings
is the death of the one accepting them: " ••• the cross represents God's
capacit.y to feel fully the depths of sin•s hostilitY•••the
of God's absoluteness."

rela~ivity

'!he resurrection, on the other hand, indica·tes

th.at God can accept the depths of man's sinfulne.ss and still remain unqua1ified, totally accepting.

9
Ibid.' p. 204.

In this sense, the cross and resurrection

s:f

,,

'

manifest God's essence of "unqualified qualifiability" which, according
'

10

to Browning, is the very str..1ctureu of love.
Browning maintains that this essence of empathic acceptance has
alw~s

existed, that it was first shown in God's " ••• creative caring

and fellowship" and after the fall, through his "• •• graceful caring and
.11

fellOtis."lip."

Moreover, God 1 s acceptance has existed from all.times,

but, because of Dian's self-imposed conditions. of worth, man has continu.

ally rejected it.

.

God's acceptance remains, however, even in the face

of man's rejection, and th:.s um;avering acceptance.
11

Forgiveness is tha

co:1t:.::'.~1ation

of God's

is .forgiveness.

ur~conditional

acceptance in spite of man's rejection of it.

empathic

Forgiveness is the nature

12

of grace. 11

There ara tHo major proble:':ls with Browning's theory... ,

'• ;

is that it would seem that grace is a necessar,y part of creation, be~

-~,

cause of God's nature - a being totally for others - and his emPathic
acceptGnce of man.

That statez::ent would seem to contradict the more

traditional description of grace as wholly gratuitous.

Hwever, this

particular problem of the gratuity of grace vs. man's tendency toward
t.he ::rJ.pernatural (the image of God in man) is beyond the boundaries of

10

Ibid., p. 205.
1 'i

Toid., P• 206.
12

Ibid., p. 207.

.:t!

t.

this study'.

The second and more immediate qu·estion involves Browning's

understanding of the person and work of Jesus Christ.

This point is

cruCial for an understanding of the sacramental character of Christ's
activities and of the sacraments themselves.
Christ, for Browning, is the manifestation of forgiveness 1;hat
13
alrea~ exists, but not the cause of forgiveness.
He maintain~ that
the event of Jesus Christ does not "reconstitute our relationship with

·

·'

God, rr but rather shows us that relationship in terms we can

.

1L

und~stand~

'

This view understands C:"lrist ·only in terms of manifes_tation and .ove.rlooks
the role of Christ as mediator.

Browning has concentrated on Christ•s

function and ignored the person.

In the next chapter we will explore

C:'lrist' s role as mediator.

}.·' :r-•:

The importance of acceptance in the therapeutic model has been
.

•'- ....

.

'~"{ ~

discussed and we have seen that the source of this acceptance . is
in Qod •
,
~·

..

,~.

~

"

But there were two parts to Rogers' description of the nature ofman:
actualization and socialization.

.t.ssu.'Tling that

accept~ce is.~

pre-

requisite of actualization, how is it can.-rmmicated - why cant t J?e
communicated?

In the therapeutic model, the client experiences

acceptance of the therapist in dialogue.
chapter, Christ

hL~self

r.>id., PP• 210 and 240.

14·
Ibid., P• 241 •

As we will see in the next

is the dialogue of

13

th~

sacr~ents.

CHAPTER V
A THEOLCGY OF DIALCGUE
Dialogue and God
The old rite of Confession with its emphasis on anonymity and
the use of fixed formulas maintained a reciprocal relationship with a
sacramental theology that often tended to be highly meChanistic.

AS

Schillebeeckx points out, "• •• the inclination lvas to look upon the sacraments as but one more application, although in a special manner, of the
1

general laws of cause and e.f::tect. rr
/

Encount(.),r p.as, no doubt, beco:ae sar.ething of ,a cliclle in modern
philcsophica.l and psychological writing, but
enco~'"lt~r

11ith God

ha~

Schillel>_e~ckx

argues that

aluays been recog1;1ized ip.,,theolorg as a .reality.

This encounter is experienced in and through dialogue.

l1a.n constantly

se;;ks to encotmter God, to experience his ,.;_cceptance, but cannot do so

by his mm power.

BrO"..ming maintained that God 1 s acceptance is al-v;ays

experienced, at least

OI1

a sul;>e.or.scious level, because of the nature

of God; however, if the therapeutic model holds true, acceptance can
only be experienced in encounter. . Schilleb.eeckx: says it is the desi.re
for encounter that is experienced by
o:-:.J~,.-

r!ill.de possible through Christ.

~1

men - but this encounter is

The first sentence of the Decree

1

E. Schil::ebeeckx, O.P., Christ the Sacrament of the Encounter
wi.th God, (:~e-vr York: Shsed end vlard, 1763), p. 3.
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56
emphasizes Christ's role as mediator.

"Reconciliation between God and

men was brought about by our Lord Jesus Christ in the nvster-J of his
2
':.
death and resurrection."
Schillebeeckx follows Augustine's history of man's search for
encounter with God, tracing it through pagan religions and Israel to

3
the emergence of the Christ.

11

All humanity receives that inward word

of God calling men to a communion in grace with himself."
is the image

or

4

This call

God in man and is the source of man's need to grow, to

'actualize' himself.

The world itself, as a creation of God (and, per-

haps as important, our n~ed to experience the world) is a 'stimulus'
that lures us to further growth and greater openness to experience.
"Life itself becomes a truly supernatural and external revelation, in
which creation begins to speak the language of salvation."
ex~ent

5

To the

one refuses to grow and persists in a sense of guilt, one is also

rejecting life itself.

2

Decree of ~~e Rite of Penance, Sacred Congregation for Divine
Worship, (reprinted by Sacred Heart Monastery, Hales Corner, Wise., 1974)
?•

3.
3

.Henri de tubac, S ,J. traces the same history in The lSJ steey: of
the Supe:-natu:ral (New York: Herder & Herder, 1967), hovrever he concentretes en the para.dox of man's desire for the encounter with the superna.tural and his inab:tli ty to attain it by his OT.rm pO'tver. Schillebeeckx
empha3izes the encounter itself.

4

Sehillebeeckx, p. 7.

5

Ibid.' p. 8.

l

The pagan

1

Church, 1 according to Schillebeeckx, experienced

moments ot grace, touched upon

the~reality

ot unconditional acceptance.

These moments (and here Schillebeeckx differs from·Browning) were
mediated through Christ, made possible by Christ.
Grace (andi' using Browning's definition, forgiveness) becomes
Dv Schillebeeckx' interpretation ot Ezekiel, one

visible in Israel.

can see that Isl"ael is defined by and given worth through its acceptance
by Yahweh.

"•• .thou w.sst ca..st out upon the face

abjection of thy soul

ci.

ot the earth in the

e.' because you were found worthle~SJ ••• passing

[Yahweh] saw that thou wast trodden under toot in thy O'.m blood.

by/ I

.And I said to thee 't-ihen thy H·ast in thy blood: Live ••• arid

~row

up ••• 11

6
(Ezekiel i6:5-7).

This encounter, again, was mediated through Christ.

Israel is, first of all, accepted; is told it is accepted (in dialogue
made possible throU6h Christ) and can, therefore, grow "like a plant in
the field."
God's acceptance re:nains even when Israel chooses to reject it
nnd to

establis..~

its

o~m

standards of worth.

''You also took your fair

jB,·rels of rrry gold and silver, which I had given you, and made for yours.:lf izn.ages otmen ••• 11 (Ezekiel i6:17).

Nevertheless, God again offers

Israel life and the possibility of growth (Ezekie! 18:30-32).

6

Ibid., p. 12.

.$8
God

continual~

offered his acceptance to Israel in dialogue, but

Israel often would not or could not respond, would refuse to live and
grOiv~ would sink into the stagnant silence of a dying relationship •. What

1"as needed, says Schillebeeckx, was one who could respond in dialogue

perfectly.

In him the response would be so complete that the barrier

between the word spoken and the response v-rou.ld be shattered.

He would

be the word itself, the dialogue itself: " ••• The perfection both of the
divine invitation and of the human response in faith.,. •• This was Jesus. 11

7

Each act of Jesus, human and divine, _is .both an act of unconditional acceptance and a perfect response to that acceptance.
always t..'le mediator of grace, makes grace possible.
.s.cce~tance

Jesus, who was

Moreover, this

is manifested in a visible fom., "a bestowal ofsalvation

in historical visi1')i11.ty; It thus, it 'is

sa~.r~:nenta:l'.

8

In the therapeutic model, the invisible, inteMor- realit.ies or
~otlon .and ncceptance are c.om."mlllicated throucfi dialogue within a visible

encounter between two people.

In a way, the expressions of acceptance

th.s.t are sensib~ preceived become a sign of an interior reality.

It is

bec.;:.use the client perceives the underlying reality that he is able .to
The encounter itself is not a sacra~ent (although it has been

change.

speculated that sa.cramental·grace may be present in a counseling situation).
llc:.~eYer,

it pro•Tides us

7
Thid. J P• 13.

8
Thid.' p.

15.

~"Hh 11

good analozy of sacrament.

.

.
59

Jesus is a visible realization of the grace of

red~'llption,

of

He is not simply the manifestation of

unconditional ·acceptance.

acceptance which exists somewhere else, in someone else; he is acceptance
itself.

He is, therefore, a. sign that causes Hhat it signifies, a

sacrament..

9

-

"The man
Jesu.s
••• is the sacra.'llent, the primo;r-dial sacrament ••
.
.

•• II

Chrfst is the center point of God's love for man and man's response to God.· 'lhere is a dmmward movement, God's love coirdng to us
10
11

by way of a humari he.ir+,

man to God.

fi

;

cmd an upward movement, Son to the Father,

Christ is d5.alogne, but, as with ever.J dialogue, there are

innumerable levels of meanings, a rainbow of nuances.
Father as his Sor. and as a man representing all men.
Father's love while besto1tdng it on men.

He worShips the
He accepts the

He is "personally a dialogue

with God the Father, the supreme realization and therefore the nor.m and
11

the source of every encounter with God."
Schilleb~ckx

gr~. .rth.

also says that Christ's life is characterized

b.1

He is not fully realized (actualized) at his birth, when he

calls his first disciples, performs his first miracle, or is honored

9
Thid., P• 15.
10

Ibid., p. 17.
'11

Ibid.' p. 18.

b.1

.

the crowds on Palm Sunday.

')

He is not willing to trade ·the possibility

of what he will become for securi~ or power (~ 4:1-1J).

He is

established absolutely as the Christ at the Resurrection - life has
grown to new

life~

love toward love.

Finally, as Schillebeeckx points out, Christ doesn't sit there·
at the right hand of the Father doing nothing.
The Son continuously worships th,e Father,

Je~us

The dialogue contimes.
sends forth his love

Sacramental encounter, man's dialogue with .
12
'
God, continues in the Church.
in the form of the Spirit.

12

--

Ibid., p. 41.

....

Dialogue and Confession
Every sacrament is a prayer; a dialogue between man and GOd, and
between men in a community made possible by God.
one sacrament, the

Chur~~,

are expressions of the one.

There is really only

and each of the traditional seven sacraments
:Bec:nse of the presence of many peQt)le,

dialogue in the other sacraments tend to become formalized and ritualized. . Confession is unique bscause it is a one-to-one encounter, a
!:leeting of two people on 'm intimate level.

Thus, Confession is the

13
ndialogue sacrament ;e3:::- exeellence."

Through this encounter with

another person, it offers the penitent an opportunity for encounter with
God in prayer.

The old rite of Penance tended to be ritualized, im-

14

personal and mechanistic.

From

t~e

the

first words or the new rite

sacrament is pla.ced on a personal level and dialogue is·pos'sible.
Like the dialogue that is .christ himself, the dialogue of Confession exists en

m3ll,V

le"rel:'l.

The new rite quotes Philippians 1 :9-10

on the possibility of ever-deepening understanding:

"M;r

prayer is that

ycur lcve for ea.ch ether Ina7 increase more and more and never stop impro~ring

your knowledge and deepening your perception. 11

As Buckley points

13
Fran·::i:~ J. Buckley, ".i.1ecer:t Development in the Sacrament of
Par:.:>.nce," Com.rn:unio (Spring, 1974) 1 :85.

iL

"The priest should welcome the penitent with fraternal charity,

c.nJ, if t11e occasion permits, add:'ess him

i6.

61

uit..~

-

friendly words." Rite, p.

62
out, the dialogue can start at one point, and within a free-flowing
conversation "peel off layer after layer of obstacles and defenses un-

1S

~

til the core of personality stands open before the gaze of God and man.n
lfuen the penitent approaches the sacrament of
so because he has alreaqy experienced

somethL~g

~nfession,

he does

of God's acceptance.

one says he is sorry unless there is hope of forgiveness.

No

Christianity

16
itself is "the realization that it is safe to love."

The penitent's

act of coming to confess is an act of faith in God's-acceptance and the
worth that acceptance creates.
nt._'l-}at

It is a sign of the penitent's
17
all is not lost, that growth is still possible."

~rust

God initiates this dialogue with the grace that first enabled the

penitent to recognize his sin; the penitent's decision to confess is a
response to t..'lat initiative.

Thus, the priest's "lvelcome, "with fratemal

chari."t'J ... w~th friendly words," represents still;. :another l$vel ot dialogue
wi t.'lin the process of Penance.

The priest' :3 words of lvelcome could, per-

:wps, also be tal.cen as represantati,:e of
penitent.

t..~e

conmunity's

interes~

Earlier we exa.--rtined thf'i rela.tionship between guilt a.11d isolation;

to refuse to grow is to cut oneself off .from the community that
!'ossibJ.e.

in the

m~es

growth

The welcome shatters the isolation that guilt has imposed and

16
Angelo Neophitos, G.!-1., "Is Confession a Gatne with God? 11
Pc:storal Life>. (July, 1975), 24:22 •

..'4•
~.

l

l
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offers the penitent the possibility of reconciliation with the

communi~.

18
· The reading of the Word of God
pe~itent

opens b.oth the prle st and the

to still deeper levels of dialogue.

God's merc,y and love are

again proclaimed, reinforcing the moments of grace that first touched
the penitent's heart.

He is again reassured that forgiveness and

gro~vth

are still possible.
The Introduction to the Rite states that contrition is the most
ir11portant act of the penitant. but this

heartful sorrow" is the nega-

11

tive half,; the sac":.ion stresses that thare should be "a profound change
19
.
11
of the lThole person.
If guilt is a refusal to grow,
then .the recog'
~

'

~

-,

nit ion and rejection of guilt necessarily brings

grow~

and change.

In confession the penitent must " ••• open his heart to the minister
20
of God.''
Here the process of dialogue is brought ·to its deep'est level.
'The penitent iS> brought to the reality of who' he is.

nlusions and

rations.lizations are swept a.side as the penitent hears his own voice
describing these t.'"lings his heart

h~d

been afraid to acknowledge.

The

9eni tent may, pemaps, watch the reaction of the priest to see forgive:"
ness as well as hear the words of absolution.'

aite of Penance, p. 16.
19

!oid., p. ! o.

20

,\

Tu!.d., p. 11.

Ear~

in the histor,r of the sacrament, the act of penance itself

was the central part of the

sacram~nt

and involved everything from

weeping and wailing at the door of the Church to embarking on long
arduous pilgrimages.

Gradual~,

and

as contrition and confession came to be
21

emphasized, the penance became routine and perfunctory.

The new

rite suggests tn•t.tbe act or penance be :relevant to the situation of
22

the penitent, "a remedy for sin and a help to renewal of life."

As

23
in contrition, the point is to grow into new life.
If dialogUe reachad its deepest level during the penitent's con-

fession,, it is most profound at the moment of absolution, for it is here
that the dialogue becomes that of God to man.

Christ is dialogue and this

beco:r.1es evident as the priest pronounces the words of absolution.

"!n

the sacrament of Penance, as in the Incarnation.; Ule human voice beccmes

24
God's voice. 11

As acceptance becomes visible in the Incarnation of

Christ, so too, forgiveness becomes visible (sensible) durin.g abs.olut~on.

21
The name of the sacrament has also shifted along with the e.'r!lphasis
of the sacrament, moving from 'Penance' to 'Confession' to the somewhat
a-,rk-ward 'Sacrament of Reconciliation.' rlhile 'Penance' remains the -official
ter.m, the more informal 'Confession' has been used throughout this study
because it emphasizes the experience of dialogue.

22
Rite of Penance, p. 11.

23

Buckley 3uggests that elaborate penance are untlecessary, 11to
ltP/e and keep on loving in a sinful -v:orld is hard enough for those ;Jho
really \Iork at it." ConuntUlio, p. 91.

24

Buckley, "I Confess, n p. 12.

••
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The old rite tended to emphasize the penitent's role and the
honesty and accurac.y of his confesjion.

Monden points out that what

the penitent tells the priest is only a sign of 1-rhat he is telling God.

25

Unlike the si tua.tion of the therapeutic model, the dialogue of confession
\.rill not falter if the penitent's confession is ina~·curate (asswn~
.

.

.

- r

~~

.

the inaccuracy is not willful) or aukward, or if the priest misunde·rstands the penitent's words. ·Confession is not a court of
.

..

but on the encou."lter with God.

.

\.

:

>

In fact, concentrating·on.a recita.-

tion of one's sins cnn become a
tite reality of God's love.

'

but"~

the accused:,

sacrament; the em,Phasis should not be on the testiinnity of

26

lw,

~e~ls

of avoiding a confrontation with

It can be a means of persisting in a

.s~n~

27
of guilt and refusing to gro-11.
The er.1ph2.sis in the new rite brings the penitent out of a self- · .
centered concentration on his.
..

J.ovr:.!.

Oim

sinfulness to an experience of Christ''s

.

Reconciled through the dialogue that is Christ, ~e penitent can

"li·..re anc gro'tr like a plant in the field."

25

Louis Hon:len, l'he Vvstery of Sin and Fo1"giveness, p. 169 •.

Bernard Ha.ering makes the sa::1e point in Shalom: Peace, The
1967), p. 11.

>3acra~·:ant of Reconciliation (Ne~v York: Inw.ge,

27
Ht:ophitos, p.

24.

CHAPTER VI

•

A 'IHEOLOGY OF RECONC:U.IATICN

Christ, who manifests and makes possible God's unconditialal
acceptance of man, is the center point of dialogue between man and God.
He is a radical Yes to life and growth, to the full meaning or being

human.

"1he Son of God, the Christ Jesus that. we proclaimed among 70U -

••• was never Yes and No: with him it was always Yes,. and however
maJV'
.
promises God made, the Yes to them is all in him." .,,(2 .. Cor. 1.
:19-21).
.
~

.

f

Persistent guilt is a 'no' to one's own htuii.anity. ·• Rogers said
that man is characterized by the need to grow and that the source of .the
~row

need to

is the actualization tendency.

Growth is JiJ.ade possible by

acceptanca.- Bro-w":ling suggested that the source of 't.h:e need·to· grow is
the image of God in man and that growth is made possible through God's
~"l~ondit.ional

acceptance, the grolL'1d of all human acceptance.· To refuse

to grow, therefore, is to deny the truth of iihat one is and the reality
of God's acceptance.
Mowrer believes that the problem of guilt is not so much the
morality of a specific act as it is the anoeymi ty of the act and the consequent need for deceit.

Acceptance experienced withlll a social context

:.s e. prerequisite for growth, however, the result or a deliberate refusal
to grc11v. is to disassociate oneself from t..he people who communicate that
1

acceptance - the Church.

Refusing all opportunities of reconciliation,

1

Haering, p. 28.
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the person can

beco~~

surrounded by an isolation that grows deeper and

is

more L'npenetrable until it has reached a state that
"Hell is our i,solated selves having finally obtained

hell itself.

th~

wish expressed

by our lives; self-entombed eternally frozen in the attitude of refusal
:

atd~ath

that leaves

'2

the resume of our entire life."

'

Therefore, al-

though one cannot eSCC\pe into nothingness through the "metapeysical
suicide"

ot

g~ilt,

itself a kind of

one does slip into a self-imposed isolation, 'Which is

nQt~in~ess.

The isolation of guilt'is ac~Ompanie& by a'sense 6f worthless·
ness.

In refusing to gro:: ons has said 'not to 'GOdts,·ace~ptanee as w""ell

as to that of th~ , canf;,ini ty.

Recondfliation bre~~ the 1barriers of

isolation and the sense of wor-thlessness.

It restores one, to relation~ th

the en-

the penitent is able to

l~sten,

ship 1-Ti th cozr.mu.ni ty so that one is able to listen 9penJ,y
tanglements of lies

an~

deceit.

ln~en

'

'

he

.3

can hear the words of God's acceptance and learn again of God's love.
'

'

Forgiveness restores the penitent's ss::1se of worth.

'

'

~

"'lhe ••• goal of the

use of the new Rite is to encourage the penitent to have done with doubts
about his worth, about the interest and goodness of God, a.YJ.d to hL."''lSelf
t2.ke the initiatives 1mich will heal hi1n of the wounds of the secular

.....

c.

Fl

l'iJ]

Robert 0 1CO!l:':'lell, s .J.' HT'ne Se::!.se of Sin in t..he Hodem 1Torld_. 11
rrstery of Sin a."ld Foz-gi-.reness, p. 19.

3
Buckley, Corr...rmmio, p. 89.

.

.).
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and the material."

4

God's initiative of grace restores the penitent's

own sense of initiative; he can once more grow through his own qecisions.
Reconciliation cannot exist merely as an abstract theory, it must
exist concretely as forgiveness between men.
rejection of

The new

rite~

with its

and its emphasis on encounter, brings the recon-

an~ty,

ciliation o:f the Paschal 11\YStery to a concrete exP,ression o:f forgiveness.
One is brought, :for a· moment, from the' majesty of Christ's Easter appearance to the disciples (Jn. 20:19-23) to the intimac.y of his encounter
•

-

.-

with Peter {Jn. 21: 15-17).
.

..

''·

-,

.\"J·t

-

The celebration of Penance: :ts the ·celebra-

tion of the Easter myster.y on a

personal~

individual level.

It restores

the penitent to the process of growth and to life itself •
. ,Cl,lrist' s incarnation was a process formed in love and gomg
through death to ne1v life.

This process of his life, death, and resur-

rection bestows on man his ability to grm.v.

Each man, formed in Christ's

love, rejects his own life when he refuses to grow.
Penance, recognizing the fundamental unity of man's

The new rite of
peycholog1c~.

and

.:;;piri tual life, . offers man the 'yes 1 to new life and growth that is

Christ himse1f.

4

Ja'rf!es F. C..'li!lpbell, "Hew Rites of Penance-new Opportunities,"
rastoral Life 24 (1975) 8:34.
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